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Daily Intelligence Brief

PROLIFERATION

SUMMARY: This collection of articles on proliferation covers a broader range of subjects than is typical of a normal *Daily Brief*. A report on a narrower topic, such as Russian weapons sales, would include a narrative summary capturing emerging trends, anomalies and such other insights as can be derived from the totality of the materials. OSS also provides weekly and monthly aggregate analyses to clients as separate reports. The media and Internet articles included in this *Daily Brief* discuss the following subjects: The threat that proliferation poses to U.S. national security; a CIA report identifying Russia and China as key providers of WMD and missile technology around the world; Russia's reaction to possible U.S. sanctions that may be imposed if Russia sells anti-tank weapons to Syria; a Russian official's admission that controls against leaks of weapons technology to Iran may be insufficient; Japanese aid to the Belarus military's nuclear missile sector; the IAEA's plans to adopt a new protocol to verify "undeclared" activities of non-weapons states and NPT signatories; Russia and India's plan to sign a strategic partnership declaration; Pakistan-UK nonproliferation talks; Polish nuclear safety; requirements for a BWC compliance regime; and the need for continued arms inspections in Iraq. In our normal report on the web site the full text of each article would be linked to the article summary.

"U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services Holds Hearing on National Security Threats," Political Transcripts by Federal Document Clearing House, 02/02/99

As you know, 1998 saw the nuclear tests in South Asia; continued concern about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs; accelerated missile development in Iran, North Korea, Pakistan and India; and the broader availability of BW- and CW-relevant technologies. Particularly worrisome to the intelligence community is the security of Russian WMD materials, increased cooperation among rogue states, and more effective efforts by proliferants to conceal illicit activities. U.S. intelligence is increasing its emphasis and resources on many of these issues, but I must tell you that there is a continued and growing risk of surprise. Looking at the supply side first, Russia and Chinese assistance to proliferant countries has merited particular attention for several years. This year, unfortunately, is no exception.

"CIA: Russia, China Key Arms Sellers Report Refutes Clinton Claim," The Washington Times, 02/11/99

The CIA has identified Russia and China as key providers of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology around the world, according to a report by the agency's Non - Proliferation Center. "Foreign weapons of mass destruction procurement managers in countries of concern have responded to Western export controls by seeking dual-use goods largely from Russia and China," the CIA said in a semiannual report to Congress. The report's conclusion on Chinese support to Pakistan appears to contradict a recent declaration by President Clinton that China was not selling nuclear weapons know-how to nations seeking the weapons. Russia's sale of missile-related goods to Iran "accelerated Iranian development of the Shahab-3" medium-range missile, the report said.

"Russia Denies Proliferation of Dual-Purpose Technologies," ITAR-TASS News Agency, 02/10/99

"Russia cannot accept accusation alleging that it outrageously violates international agreements on non - proliferation of missile, nuclear-missile and dual-purpose technologies," First Russian Vice-Premiere Yuri Maslyukov told Itar-Tass on Wednesday, commenting on accusations against Russia contained in a CIA report to the US Congress. On Tuesday, the CIA submitted a report devoted to problem of non - proliferation of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons to U.S. lawmakers in which the CIA declared that Russia, China and North Korea belong to the group of countries believed to be the main suppliers of dual-purpose technologies and military hardware to the world market. Maslyukov declared that "Russia possesses an efficient enough system of exports control to prevent leak of missile technologies and other technologies connected with creation of weapons of mass destruction."

"Russia Does Not Recognize Extraterritoriality of U.S. Laws - Foreign Ministry," ITAR-TASS News Agency (World Service) via BBC, 02/05/99

"We do not recognize the extraterritoriality of American laws - be it in Cuba, Iran or Syria," Vladimir Rakhmanin, an official spokesman of the Russian Foreign Ministry, said today, commenting on the intentions of the U.S. Department of State to try to get aid to Russia reduced in the event of Moscow selling conventional anti-tank weapons to Syria. "We proceed from the fact that military-technical cooperation between sovereign states is their inalienable right in line with the right to self-defence, laid down in the UN Charter," the director of the Information and Press Department of the Foreign Ministry stressed at a briefing. When cooperating with other countries in this sphere we, of course, strictly adhere to our international obligations, including in the sphere of nonproliferation and export control and the UN sanctions regime, Vladimir Rakhmanin explained.

"Russia Warns on Weapons Leaks," AP Online, 02/11/99

Russia's controls against leaks of weapons technology to Iran may be insufficient and need to be improved, the Russian security chief conceded Thursday. Until now, Moscow had adamantly denied U.S. accusations that some private Russian companies are getting around government export restrictions and smuggling weapons technology to Iran. But at a government meeting called to review the problem Thursday, Russian Security Council head and presidential chief of staff, Nikolai Bordyuzha, conceded that "there are still blank spots in this sphere," the Interfax news agency reported. "A number of firms have been independently going to the international market," Bordyuzha said. Bordyuzha called for export controls to be tightened, but it wasn't clear whether he agreed that weapons technologies have actually been leaking from Russia, or was simply urging stricter controls as a precaution.

"Belarus Aid to Reduce Nuke Staff," Asahi Shimbun/Ashai Evening News, 02/04/99

The government on Wednesday provided 300 million yen to Belarus to help the former Soviet republic cope with military staff who lose their jobs as it dismantles its nuclear missile operations, Foreign Ministry officials said. The money will be used to buy equipment for a vocational training center soon to open in the city of Lida, the officials said. The money is part of Japan's \$100-million (11.5 billion yen) aid pledge to help former Soviet republics dispose of or manage their nuclear arsenals and materials. The latest aid follows Tokyo's promise of 3

billion yen to help Russia build nuclear waste disposal facilities; a 500-million-yen deal to help Kazakhstan develop computer technology for managing nuclear material at power plants and research centers; and similar programs for Belarus and Ukraine.

"IAEA Plans Protocol to Verify 'Undeclared' Activities," The Hindu, 02/18/99

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is adopting a new protocol to verify "undeclared" or clandestine activities of non-weapon States and the NPT signatories. "About 40 countries have signed the new protocol," said Dr. Mohammed Elbaradei, director-general of the IAEA. The need for having the protocol was felt after the failure of the IAEA inspectors to detect Iraq's weapons programme. This was because they were concentrating on "safeguarded" and declared nuclear activities of 180 signatories of the NPT and not on their undeclared or clandestine programmes.

"Russia and India Ready to Sign Strategic Partnership Declaration," ITAR-TASS News Agency (World Service) via BBC, 02/16/99

Russia and India are ready to sign a declaration on strategic partnership which will envisage close serious long-term cooperation in every area, Russian ambassador to India Albert Chernyshev told reporters. "Russia has earlier signed a strategic partnership declaration with China and is now going to bring relations with friendly India to the same level," Chernyshev said. The declaration will make it possible to step up Russo-Indian cooperation in such areas as nuclear power, petrochemistry and civil aviation, as well as considerably to expand and consolidate commercial ties.

"Pakistan, U.K. to Hold Non-Proliferation Talks," Xinhua English Newswire, 02/07/99

Britain's Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Derek Fatchett will arrive here Monday to discuss nuclear non - proliferation and regional security issues with Pakistani officials. Fatchett will meet Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif for talks on the matters pertaining to nuclear non - proliferation and regional security. Fatchett's visit follows a two-day visit to Pakistan by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott which ended on February 2. During his visit, Talbott held the eighth round of U.S.-Pakistan talks with Pakistani officials on peace and security and nuclear non - proliferation.

"Polish Nuclear Safety Evaluated," Polish News Bulletin, 02/03/99

In its latest January report on the state of nuclear safety in Poland, the Supreme Board of Inspection (NIK) voiced a number of reservations concerning the adequacy of anti-radiation safeguards employed by the Atomic Energy Institute in Swierk and the Polatom Isotope Research and Development Centre, also located in Swierk, which is the main producer and distributor of radioactive materials in Poland. NIK inspectors claimed to have discovered an unregistered source of iridium-192 in the isotopes storage area of the Atomic Energy Institute, as well as a container of depleted uranium not registered in the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) register. At a press conference convened on January 19, Professor Jerzy Niewodniczanski, chairman of the State Atomic Agency, said that until recently, the depleted uranium was not considered to be an atomic and radioactive substance and did not require registration. As regards the allegedly unregistered source of iridium-192 mentioned in the report, Niewodniczanski said that the source had been registered in the proper department of the Polish Atomic Agency, and he assured that Poland's system of registering radioactive substances is "very secure."

“Aerosol Trigger,” Federation of American Scientists Working Group on BW Verification, December 1998

A BWC compliance regime should require declaration of dual-use capabilities that could be used for purposes prohibited by the BWC. The capability for certain kinds of aerosol work is one of the most important discriminators for potentially illicit activities because aerosol work is critical to BW development and has relatively few peaceful purposes. Aerosol studies are a "choke point" at which legitimate and illicit activities with microorganisms or toxins often begin to diverge. Declaration of aerosol capabilities, contributing to their transparency, is therefore particularly important for establishing confidence in compliance.

<http://www.fas.org/bwc/papers/aer2.htm>

“Military Strikes in Iraq: Inspections, Sanctions Must Stay in Place to Prevent Nuclear Weapons Program Reconstitution,” Institute for Science and International Security, 12/17/98

When the dust settles from the military strikes in Iraq, the United States must ensure that effective inspections resume in Iraq to ensure that it does not reconstitute its nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction programs, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) warned today. The inspections are conducted by the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Action Team, where the IAEA Action Team is responsible for the nuclear inspections. If inspections are not resumed, or if the UN-imposed sanctions are severely weakened by military action, Iraq is likely to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program.

<http://www.isis-online.org/>

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[Previous](#) [EuroIntel '99 Proliferation Web Sites,](#)

[Next](#) [EuroIntel '99 Genocide Web Sites,](#)

[Return to Electronic Index Page](#)