Jane's Approach to the New Threat Environment

INTRODUCTION/SLIDE
1. On the plane from London, I found myself sitting next to a very interesting gentleman who happened to be a retired educational psychologist from George Washington University. He was fascinated to hear of my presentation here this morning but was aghast to learn that I was scheduled to speak for a full half-hour. According to research he had conducted many years ago, 10 minutes was the maximum attention span anyone could sustain during an address. At this, my heart sank - I thought that perhaps I should ask Robert Steele to reschedule the entire conference armed with such open source intelligence! Hoping to revive my flagging spirits, I asked my fellow passenger what his research showed people did after 10 minutes of intense concentration. I was somewhat surprised to hear that 80 per cent of people experienced some sort of pleasurable memory or fantasy such as thinking about a happy holiday on an idyllic island or dreaming about an amourous adventure with a silver-screen star. This time, I felt like taking the next flight home as my task seemed all too much. What hope did I have in the face of such evidence and such odds! But then a glimmer of hope returned as I realized that I should take some comfort from the fact that, even if I talk for my allotted time, then 80 per cent of you here today are going to enjoy yourselves, no matter what I have to say. I only hope that what I do say makes up for the disappointment or frustration which the remaining 20 per cent of you may feel by the end of my presentation.

2. So, without further ado, let me now address the issue before us and see how Jane's, as an information vendor, considers the opportunities for co-operation between agencies and organizations in the new threat environment we all find ourselves in today. In order to do this in any coherent fashion, I have divided my talk into three parts which I have titled (**SLIDE**) - CRISES, CONCEPTS and CURRENCY - the three 'Cs'. The crises part refers, quite simply, to the problems of dealing with the post-Cold War world, a partial understanding of which is necessary before anyone, whether in the private or public sector, can design plans or products - the so called concepts - for the future. The currency part of the equation is the value and validity which can be attached to our responses, a vital element if credibility - the hidden fourth 'C' - is to be achieved.

CRISES
3. So let me begin with the crises.(**SLIDE**) I was tempted to call this section chaos because matching the hopes of the 'new world order' with the horrors of the real world disorder where the likes of Serbs and Somalis abound, is a difficult, some would say impossible, task. The myriad of ethnic, nationalist and religious conflicts which clutter the international agenda have arisen partially as a result of the thaw which has taken place with the

ending of the Cold War – for 45 years the natural and national development of many countries has been frozen by a restraining bipolar world. Now we are having to watch as old scores are settled in the guise of independence and multipolarity. Moreover, we are still trying to resolve them with political doctrines and security structures designed for the Cold War, and which are all too often proving inadequate in the face of current demands – inadequate at prediction, inadequate at planning and inadequate at policing. If they are falling short then it follows that they need changing and if they are to change in any meaningful way we require more information, not less, on potential conflicts and conflicts in being. Above all, the conversion of information into intelligence – the so called intelligence cycle – must operate faster and more efficiently than hitherto.

4. I guess that we must be thankful that many of today's conflicts remain localized but, still, several have the potential for escalation either geographically, as fear of a third Balkan war gives testimony, or destructively through weapon proliferation, as in the case of modified Scud missiles going to Iran and Syria from North Korea. According to US sources, more than 24 Third World countries will have ballistic missiles and about 30 will have an offensive chemical weapons capability by the end of the century! Furthermore, the disintegration of the former Soviet Union coupled with the desperate need for hard currency by many former Soviet allies, has released a plethora of arms onto the market to feed the regional thirst for blood letting, while the old USSR itself could provide the largest contest of them all with Russia battling against Ukraine.

5. The problems which these scenarios generate for the information provider and intelligence consumer are two-fold. First, there is the **physical** problem arising from the fact, which I have already alluded to, that the material on which to base an assessment or plan all too often does not exist or, if it does, it is extremely sketchy. Having focused so exclusively on the Red peril from the East for the past 45 years, we have ignored at our peril the collection of data from other directions. The invasion of the Falklands Islands by Argentina in 1982 revealed that not only were there no maps showing terrain suitability but also the best coastal charts were from a private individual who sailed the inshore waters in his spare time. When the duty officer in London received the invasion message, he reportedly reached for an atlas, a copy of *Jane's Defence Weekly*, and a double Scotch! I won't say which was most useful but it doesn't say much for our intelligence or diplomatic services!!

6. Another important point here is the fact that the very nature of the many of today's conflicts makes it difficult to gather data upon which to base policies and formulate plans. Generals Aideed or Mladic, not too mention our old adversary Saddam, do not readily lend themselves to satellite inspection, and orders of battle are of little use when dealing with say Azerbaijan – even the Azeris don't know themselves which way the enemy is coming from after having nine defence ministers in the past two years.

/02.

7. The second problem I want to touch on briefly is what I would describe as **psychological**. By this, I mean the mind-set which stems from the Cold War itself. The secrecy which surrounded that period has produced in many analysts a belief of infallibility and a pride in exclusivity. The application of codewords and security classifications gives an air of accuracy and authority, features which certainly should not be compromised by sharing with others outside the CANUKUS circle. However, as I have already indicated, the conflicts of today do not lend themselves to the old methods of closed-shop analysis. There is an increasing need to adopt the international approach through joint action in the UN, CSCE, an expanded NATO, and other less select foreign bodies, so material has to be discussed and disseminated whether we like it or not. And if more light is to be shed on the dimly lit arena then we need all the help and all the sources we can lay our hands on.

CONCEPTS

8. What concepts (**SLIDE**) or responses can be offered to meet these crises, both physical and psychological, and how can an information vendor, such as *Jane's*, respond to the new demands and help correct past failings. Well, *Jane's* has been providing defence information since 1898 when our founder, Fred T Jane, published the first edition of 'Fighting Ships'. As an astute observer of both ships and state, he once remarked that while the British were superb builders of ships, they all too often made a complete mess of things whenever they stepped ashore - as Americans, perhaps you would concur. This assessment besides, our tradition and lineage does give Jane's some experience of the market and how not to step ashore. Nevertheless, today's market is a very different one from the days of the "Dreadnought" or "US Maine".

9. I believe the diverse nature of the modern security environment, with all its unpredictable and intractable skirmishes, can best be served by a company like *Jane's* providing the broadest possible coverage of both countries and conflicts in the greatest possible depth. *Jane's Intelligence Review*, for example, has moved away from purely Soviet matters and taken on a wider remit by looking at potential threats to security across the globe, both in terms of politico-strategic and military-technical affairs. So, in the same edition, it is now possible to find an analysis of the Hamas terrorist group in the Middle East, an assessment of the dangers of radioactive pollution from post-Soviet reactors in the Nordic region, and an examination of the nuclear and chemical capabilities of North Korea. You can't get much more diverse range of problems than that!

10. The collection of such 'intimate' details permits the compilation of reports and surveys which include orders of battle, equipment scales, defence installations, military personalities, and much more. Such unclassified documents would prove invaluable to any company or country preparing to enter unfamiliar terrain. Easily readable, easily accessible, and easily updated - it provides an unclassified first step to operational planning. Such data forms the basis of our new

Sentinel product, a sample copy of which is on display here today. In the first survey of nine countries in the Gulf, we have tried to combine political and economic data with details on armies and armaments. For the busy executive or staff officer faced with a sudden crisis over, say Abu Musa, Sentinel might provide a more readable and usable brief than the Joint Service paper marked Top Secret and locked in the chief of staff's safe. We plan to produce further reports on the Balkans and the South China Sea later this year and next.

11. It is essential that this and all similar information can be available electronically via some sort of data base so that it can be manipulated by the customer for his particular requirements, and amalgamated with other, perhaps more confidential, material. Hence the move with all our magazines, yearbooks and other publications to record electronically vast quantities of both pages and pictures on CD-ROM and UNIX systems. Our Electronic Information System, EIS, captures all our information in one package, a package which can be integrated with most other information handling processes. In fact, I believe we will see a general move towards a common data-bus arrangement whereby users can tap into the wealth of information and, by cross-referencing, verify a report no matter from where or whom. I will return to the question of validation later.

12. As for the psychological problem I referred to earlier, let me now say a few words about how we can prevent ourselves falling into the mind-set of yesteryear. I think that an overreliance on secrecy and technology will only perpetuate the problem, although I would be the first to admit that there is a place for these as well. A more conscious move towards the greater use of HUMINT - the man on the ground - could well be the way forward. I say this because it is the agent, the journalist, the tourist who can often provide the best information, information not available to the more prying satellite or overtaxed diplomat. *Jane's* relies on over 200 different authors in 94 different countries to compile its weekly and monthly magazines. These are, in the main, experts or academics in their fields with an intimate knowledge of the countries concerned, visiting places and people beyond the reach or remit of official government sources.

13. However, I would be the first to admit that *Jane's*, like all open-source providers, can only do so much, and it is the partnership with other agencies which will eventually reveal the truth, albeit rarely the whole truth. We at *Jane's* are just one cog in a much bigger mechanism but, like a clock, it does depend on all the cogs working in synchrony if you are to read the right time. On both sides of the Atlantic, I believe we need a comprehensive and co-ordinated intelligence doctrine, one which has the ability, and above all the desire, to incorporate all sources. The doctrine must also give more weight to seeing the target from the targets perspective and this is where country specialists, particularly experienced academics and journalists, are invaluable, people who have a natural affinity with the countries concerned and who can strip away the niceties and

nuances.

CURRENCY
14. Let me now draw my address to a close by dealing with a few points which I have loosely put under the heading of currency (**SLIDE**). The points are really offered in an attempt to redress the common criticisms of open sources, namely value and validation.

15. In terms of value, I think that this can be addressed at two levels. First, what value we should attach to open sources in general, and secondly, does it give value for money? As to the first question, let me remind you of a few scoops. I have already mentioned the Argentine invasion of 1982 - that was predicted two-days before the event by a newspaper in Buenos Aires. Furthermore, we heard in this forum last year the way in which the detailed organization of the drug traffickers in Colombia was revealed by the meticulous analysis of local press reports. So the material is out there to achieve assessments hitherto not possible even by the most sophisticated country or technology. As to the second question of value for money, I think we are all aware that the cut backs in budgets which affect the intelligence community as so many other departments now mean that if we are to cover more of the world with fewer resources then we must do it more efficiently and effectively, and that means also more cheaply than hitherto. Open-source material is a relatively inexpensive way of filling in the gaps - not in all circumstances, but certainly in the majority of occasions. We often receive criticism for the price of our products but they are a drop in the ocean with a K-11 satellite! Admiral Chernavin of the Former Soviet Navy once said that if anyone wanted to know about the Soviet Navy then they should look at Jane's Fighting Ships - Fred T Jane would have been proud.

16. As for the accuracy of unclassified reporting and the validation of open-sources in general, I would again like to remind you that the most classified data in the late 1940s of Soviet force strength, data which was not revised until the end of the next decade, was of a Soviet army of about 175 full-strength divisions. It now seems that a picture of roughly one-third full-strength, one-third partial strength, and one-third cadre formations would have been more accurate. It is also clear we underestimated Soviet achievements in missile accuracy in the late 1970s and overestimated the Soviet bomber force and initial deployment of ICBMs in the 1950s. More topically, and even armed with all the modern technical means, we seem to have overestimated Saddam's forces by as much as 50 per cent in some areas! If this ritual washing of dirty linen is not enough, one historian has calculated that 'during the half century from 1914 to 1964, the decisions to go to war or to expand a war seem to have involved major errors of fact in more than half the cases'. So we are all fallible. Even the most expensive threat analysis will be flawed on the day not just by the fog of war but also by the sheer weight of information. However, it is the weight of information which if collected, analyzed, compared and cross-referenced will provide the answers. It is the paradox that the

more validated sources, the less chance of disaster there is.

17. It seems to me that the way forward is basically two-fold:

* First, decide, for reasons of time and cost, whether information which is 80 per accurate is more useful than information which is 100 per cent accurate but too late to influence events.

* Second, focus on combining open sources and classified reporting in such a way that the latter is not corrupted but the former is corroborative. Our EIS system is a vehicle for this type of integration.

Jane's certainly does not pretend to get it all correct all of the time, but hopefully it gets it right for most of the people for most of the time. As I have already suggested, that is the essence of the intelligence game if we are to produce results in an ever shortening time frame by ever demanding leaders in an ever more complex world. On that tortuous point, I think my time frame has just expired so let me thank you for your attention. I hope my presentation hasn't added to your frustration but given you some food for thought as you contemplate lunch and your journey home this afternoon.

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CONCEPTS

CRISES

CURRENCY

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