

## OPEN SOURCE SOLUTIONS 1994: THE STATE OF INTELLIGENCE

by

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The established lines of forces which delimited the intelligence playing field and defined the rules of the game have disappeared with the end of the Cold War. Although there may not be a clear case for causality, the end of the Cold War has been closely followed by peace initiatives between Israel and the PLO, then Jordan, and perhaps soon Syria. Former ANC "terrorists" are now running the government in South Africa. Even Downing Street is getting ready to sit down at the same table with the IRA. On the other hand, now that the "lid's off," the Balkans have come back to life in their traditional conflictive manner and local "dirty wars" have become "run of the mill" in the former Soviet Union. And in Haiti to top it all, we have seen an American military intervention in the Western Hemisphere to restore an elected government even though it has left of center credentials. The old compasses and sextants just don't work on the new intelligence playing field. So where is the new north and which way are the currents pulling?

### A New Great Divide In Europe?

Probably the first major question an intelligence specialist would ask is whether new lines of force are developing as the old ones weaken and disappear. There indeed seems to be a new division of intelligence "spheres of influence" between the traditional poles of the bipolar world. With a center of power uniting North America and Western Europe on one side, and on the other the vaguely defined "Slavic" or Eastern European world centered on Moscow, there must by definition be a border somewhere between the two. Based on numerous "minor" incidents over the past year involving military, intelligence and law enforcement services, it seems the border runs between Finland and Russia south to the Baltic republics which would very much like to be on the western side, but whose situation remains undetermined due to their strong economic dependence on Russia. Continuing south, Poland also wants to be on the western side, but attempts at reforming secrecy - their bill on classification of official secrets has once again been voted down - and reforming the services have encountered difficulties (Polish military police trainees at NATO admired American MPs and their training but found that there were far too many women and Blacks). France definitely wants Poland with the West but the U.S. has been hesitant due to the country's political and economic instability. It remains a case to be watched.

Next comes the Czech Republic, clearly a member of the West, and Slovakia, a seemingly "reluctant" Easterner. The Czech's are selling off their recent model MiGs while Slovakia is buying more of the same from Russia. Some of Slovakia's aggressive arms merchants probably even considered buying up the Czech MiGs but Prague wants them "out

of the theater." Elected Slovak officials who have closely scrutinized the "friendship" agreement signed about a year ago with Russia have found that "friendship" includes obligatory cooperation with the KGB's successor and the use of Slovak bases by the Russia military in "times of crisis." So here the East/West border is rather clear and has been physically established where it had not existed previously. It is now a real border that involved a real divorce: as former Czechoslovak tanks were paraded for the last time, for every one that would turn right and go to Slovakia, two would turn left and go to the Czech Republic. No one has dared say how the intelligence files were "divided up" between the two countries.

Hungary is making great efforts to place itself on the western side of the intelligence divide. It has concrete reasons for doing so; when Serbian jets "mistakenly" but repeatedly bombed Hungarian villages near the border, Hungary discovered that their air defense system couldn't distinguish between "friendly" Hungarian fighters and not so "friendly" Serbian aircraft. Now the Hungarian air force is being equipped with standard NATO IFF (identification friend foe) equipment and flying cover for NATO AWACS on duty over the Balkans. This would mean that to get a shot at American or French AWACS you would first have to shoot down a Hungarian MiG. However, Hungary is still getting the cold shoulder from the West which is waiting for the country to settle down and re-calibrate its entire industry to production intended for the West and not for the East.

No one is really betting on Romania managing to settle down or finding a spot on the western side of the intelligence border. The same goes for Serbia and particularly for Bulgaria whose language and culture are as close to Russia as the Ukraine is. Slovenia, which quietly converted its industry to Western standards over ten years ago, is now firmly anchored in the West, and for some observers too anchored with Germany and Austria. Then there is the question of Croatia and Bosnia. In literal and vivid terms, Bosnia is an intelligence and military battleground while Croatia serves as a staging area for that battle. At the same time, Croatia has been forced to find its place on the western side or disappear as a country. It is currently serving as the universal sink for all the West's "dirt tricks" operatives both young and old, a type of intelligence cooperation that is neither stable or constructive.

Albania and Macedonia find themselves in a situation somewhat similar to that of Croatia; to survive they have to ally themselves with the West. Therefore there was little to do about installing a CIA base in Albania for Gnat surveillance drones flying over Serbia. And NATO military intelligence posts are an important part of the Western contingent in Macedonia.

Finally there is Greece, the most "friendly" European country toward Palestinian movements of all kinds and therefore considered an easy European entry-point for Middle Eastern terrorists. Moreover, corruption is so endemic that the European Union considers infrastructure investment in Greece the worst place to put money. The same seems to hold for intelligence and security. In short, it's not a problem of East or West but who's pulling the strings and who's paying.

## **Drugs-Terrorism-Organized Crime or Economic Intelligence?**

Besides the First and Second World's confrontation in Europe, the end of the Cold War has brought about tremendous internal or "domestic" changes in intelligence and intelligence services. How do you justify a budget without a credible enemy - who's probably having budget problems too. As one article titled recently, "Is there Life after the Cold War for the NRO (National Reconnaissance Office)?" British MI5 found the IRA to replace the KGB and the GRU and guaranteed for the past year or so a major portion of its budget. Now with peace cropping up, what will MI5 do? Like the CIA and the FBI, like the French DGSE and DST, like the German BND and BfV, the new holy trinity is marched out: Drugs, Terrorism and Organized Crime. But converting the CIA and the others to such tasks, even if the new trinity really does constitute a major threat to our civilization, may mean spending more to obtain less when rebuilding new intelligence services is probably the only cost-efficient solution. NRO high-resolution satellites may be technological marvels, but a few highly paid informants in drugs, terrorism and organized crime would be much more effective and only cost a fraction of the price of a new Keyhole satellite.

The other great threat to our civilization that has been identified recently by some intelligence specialists is "economic intelligence" or industrial espionage. But major companies have been fighting each other on this playing field for generations. It is true the techniques and systematization have evolved tremendously, particularly with the advent of new information technologies, but the game remains the same with more or less the same rules. Now however the intelligence services of most major countries searching for a new post-Cold War role want to play in this game. The CIA is even proposing to be the world's referee for what CIA Director R. James Woolsey calls the international "level playing field." The trouble is that the intelligence services are specialists in collecting information but novices in economic intelligence integrated into a competitive, production-oriented system. It will be extremely difficult for them to effectively referee or play seriously in a game they have only been involved in as collectors of information or as law enforcement authorities.

### **A Future Modus Operandi**

But the end of the Cold War has not spelled the end of intelligence. It has however called for the in-depth cost-efficient re-organization of intelligence in relation to its institutional partners and in relation to its mission. In this context, the future of open source information in official intelligence work seems to be almost without limit and is the rallying call of the continuing crusade of Robert D. Steele and OPEN SOURCE SOLUTIONS, Inc. Cost-efficient national intelligence can and should be coupled with open source information and with encouraging open source infrastructure on a national basis. The two should mutually reinforce each other in their development.

There nonetheless remains the "nitty gritty" part of intelligence work. Recruiting agents, handling "walk-ins," setting up "cut outs" plus other forms of "trade craft" which will remain post-Cold War specialties of even the most cost-efficient intelligence services. However, what is definitely going to change is maintaining veritable "off-the-shelf" armies for "dirty tricks" or special operations anywhere in the world and at any time. That has

probably died with the Cold War and the future can probably be seen in the new Department of Energy (DoE) - Department of Defense (DoD) set up concerning the counter-proliferation Initiative. In this case, intelligence and technical expertise concerning weapons of mass destruction is centralized by the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) of the DoE. They have access to information coming from the entire American intelligence community. But to act, the NEST calls on the Special Operations Forces (SOF) of the DoD. The SOF provide the infrastructure, logistics and military manpower for joint operations with the NEST which in turn provides intelligence, objectives and technical expertise.

This new division of labor was laid out recently in an official position paper and may well point the way to the future for intelligence operations: clearly dividing activity between managing operations and managing information. If it works for atomic bombs, perhaps it will work for drugs, for terrorism or for organized crime. If the NEST-SOF solution proves to be effective, other small specialized teams could be created to manage a particular intelligence specialty while relying on joint operations with specialized military teams when action is required. Already, organized crime is being effectively attacked through its bank accounts by the Department of Treasury's FinCEN financial intelligence service and their computer specialists in information analysis. When action is necessary, it can be done jointly with the FBI which has, on the other hand, closed down its own long-term financial analysis efforts. Drugs and terrorism would seem to be the next logically step and therefore topics to watch over the next year.

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